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The paper addresses the question of who benefits from public recreation areas. Employing a 
set of survey data from users and nonusers of state owned recreation and conservation areas 
in Finland, we derive two measures for distributional analysis. The first, the income elasticity 
of  willingness  to  pay  for  recreation  services,  indicates  that  public  provision  of  recreation 
benefits  lower income  groups  more  than  higher income  groups.  The  second,  a  welfare 
measure including efficiency loss, reveals ambiguous impacts depending on the level of the 
fee  implemented.  Low  fee  levels  decrease  recreation  visits  among  lower income  users, 
whereas high fees reduce the welfare level of higher income users in particular. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Economists have long been concerned about whether government provision of 
public goods benefits other than high income groups despite the initial political intention of 
serving the needs of all citizens (Besley & Coate 1991). Interestingly, recreation services in 
national parks provided by the government have both a private good component – captured by 
the  use  of  the  services  –  and  a  public  good  component  –  seen,  for  example,  in  users’ 
preferences  with  regard  to  nature  conservation.  Previous  studies  that  have  estimated 
conventional income elasticity measures for the private good demand for outdoor recreation 
facilities categorize recreation as a luxury good (Borcherding & Deaton 1972, Bergstrom & 
Goodman 1973). More recent studies have shown that at least the use of recreation services 
seems  to  be  biased  towards  relatively  wealthy  people  (e.g.,  Cordell  et  al.  2002,  Pouta  & 
Sievänen 2001). An intuitive explanation is that when there are costs involved in the use of 
recreation services, e.g. travel and equipment, higher income households can better afford to 
enjoy public recreation services. Countering this, of course, is the argument that as recreation 
is a time consuming activity, the opportunity cost of time is lower for households with lower 
incomes; for example, evidence from travel cost studies indicates that the income elasticity 
for changes in recreational consumer surplus is less than one (Morey et al. 1993).  
There is some evidence, however, that other than user values, e.g. conservation 
and the cultural values associated with national parks and wilderness areas, are as important 
as opportunities to use these areas (Aldy et al. 1999, Huhtala 2004). Like use of recreation 
services (a private good), nature protection or other programs to improve the quality of the 
environment (public  goods) are often classified as luxury demand (e.g., Baumol &  Oates 
1989),  even  though  few  studies  have  actually  considered  the  environmental  equity  issues 
associated with conserving unique ecosystems (as pointed out, e.g., by Aldy et al. 1999). In 
fact, the income elasticity of willingness to pay (WTP) for ecosystem services provided by the   4 
environment (clean air, water purification, pollination) is typically found to be less than one in 
contingent valuation studies, indicating that ecosystem services are to be considered normal 
goods (Kriström & Riera 1996, Hökby & Söderqvist 2003, Horowitz & McConnell 2003).  
Given  the  mixed  evidence,  financing  public  recreation  services  becomes  a 
puzzling task at least where equity is concerned. Major motives for governments to subsidize 
recreation services are the positive impact of outdoor recreation on health and well being and 
the environmental education promoted by nature conservation areas. Implementing user fees 
for state owned recreation areas would shift the financial burden from all taxpayers to the 
actual users. Here the fundamental question becomes how alternative funding schemes (taxes 
or user fees) affect the distribution of net benefits of public recreation services. In order to 
translate  benefits  into  welfare  gains,  we  need  to  measure  how  different  individuals 
(users/nonusers; “the rich”/”the poor”) value public recreation services. 
We study the relationship between income and WTP for collectively provided 
state owned  recreation  and  conservation  areas  in  Finland  to  determine  the  distribution  of 
benefits  from  the  current  recreation  services  financed  by  all  taxpayers  and  the  potential 
impacts  of  implementing  user  fees.  Previous  studies,  particularly  those  in  the  US,  have 
extensively  examined  issues  of  equity  and  the  appropriateness  of  the  fees  charged  (for  a 
review, see Williams & Black 2002). The research indicates that higher fees would have a 
discriminatory impact on low income users and that revenue maximizing fees would price a 
considerable proportion of the present users of national forests out of the market (e.g., Reiling 
et al. 1992, Teasley et al. 1994). Nevertheless, in 2004 the US Congress passed the Federal 
Lands Recreation Enhancement Act, which authorizes federal land management agencies to 
charge recreational use fees and retain the revenues. For example, the United States Forest   5 
Service (USFS) has introduced fees at about 60% of its forests and has more than doubled its 
total recreation fee revenues in ten years (Espey 2005).  
The Nordic countries differ fundamentally from the US, however, in that their 
institutions include a common right of access to all natural (undeveloped) areas where the 
latter has a certain tradition of charging for recreational access to public lands (Espey 2002). 
Given this difference, we investigate a representative sample of the Finnish population that 
includes both users and nonusers of the recreation services provided by all of the state owned 
outdoor recreation parks. The data used are a sub sample of the extensive National Survey of 
the  Finnish  Outdoor  Recreation  (Sievänen  2001).  The  survey  included  questions  eliciting 
people's willingness to pay for recreation services in state owned recreation and conservation 
areas. 
The few studies that have determined the income elasticity of WTP from stated 
preference surveys have mainly used meta analysis (Schläpfer 2006) and paid less attention to 
survey specific  factors  such  as  respondents’  familiarity  with  the  good  valued,  payment 
vehicle used, and distribution of income in the parent population. As we are not trying to 
settle  definitively  the  issue  of  income  effects  in  contingent  valuation  surveys,  we  focus 
instead on a single data set; however, we go beyond the income elasticity of WTP and, for 
comparison, investigate the consumer surplus by income group non parametrically   free from 
specification  of  functional  forms,  estimation  methods,  etc.  First,  we  derive  the  income 
elasticity of willingness to pay for recreation services for several respondent categories of the 
survey sample. The categories were determined by use behavior (user/nonuser) and by the fee 
payment  scheme  suggested  in  the  WTP  questionnaire  (recreation  pass/tax).  The  payment 
scheme is interesting in that fees are considered regressive while at least some forms of taxes 
(income) used for financing recreation services are viewed as progressive (see discussion in   6 
More 1999). The income elasticity of WTP tells us whether the share of WTP allocated to 
recreation services decreases or increases with income in each category. Second, we estimate 
a  consumer  surplus  measure  from  marginal  WTP  curves  for  two  income  groups  (lower 
/higher than median income). These consumer surplus measures are illustrative for addressing 
questions such as who  benefits most from the  recreation services.  Interestingly, the point 
estimates of the income elasticity of WTP show that current policies favor the lower income 
group  and  fees  would  reduce  welfare,  whereas  consumer  surplus  measures  give  a  more 
detailed  and  mixed  picture.  Welfare  changes  depend  on  efficiency  losses,  which  in  part 
depend on the fee level implemented.  
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  The  section  to  follow  discusses  the 
hypotheses and briefly describes the statistical methods used. The next two sections present 
the data and the results of the demand analysis, respectively. The concluding section discusses 
policy implications with a special emphasis on whether public funding of recreation services 
is justified and, if so, to which extent and on which grounds. 
 
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND AND STATISTICAL METHODS APPLIED 
In order to analyze the distributional impacts of public provision of subsidized 
recreation services, it is necessary to estimate the incidence of benefits from these services. 
Obvious indicators for determining benefit incidence are estimates of income elasticity and 
consumer surplus measures. Two measures can be derived from our survey data: an estimate 
of the income elasticity of WTP for environmental goods and a welfare measure consisting of 
a monetary measure of utility change based on a hypothetical contingent valuation scenario.    7 
The income elasticity of WTP for environmental goods 
The theoretical literature has emphasized that a clear distinction should be made 
between the income elasticity of demand and the income elasticity of WTP (Hanemann 1991, 
Flores & Carson 1997, Ebert 2003). The income elasticity of WTP is an elasticity derived for 
a  “virtual  price”  for  environmental  quality  elicited  in  contingent  valuation  studies.  The 
income elasticity of WTP is of the form εw=d(ln  WTP)/d(lnM), where M is income. The 
income elasticity of WTP, εw, indicates whether the share of WTP allocated to the recreation 
services in question decreases or increases with income. The distribution of environmental 
benefits is “pro poor” if εw<1, proportional if εw=1, and “pro rich” if εw>1. (See, e.g., Hökby 
& Söderqvist 2003.) 
Given that a payment card was used for eliciting WTP responses, we derive the 
income elasticity of WTP from demand functions estimated by interval regression (see, e.g., 
Greene 1998, Maddala 2001, Woolridge 2002). The essence of the estimation procedure is to 
take  into  account  the  fact  that  WTP  responses  cannot  be  considered  deterministic  point 
estimates but are known only for the intervals, i, used in the bid vector (Cameron & Huppert 
1989). (See Appendix 1 for the econometric model and the log likelihood function.) We use a 
lognormal conditional distribution for valuations, or yi = ln(WTPi) ~ N[0,σ
2], whereby the 
mean of the untransformed WTP variable is exp(βx+σ
2/2) and the median is exp(βx). This 
indicates that the mean as a welfare measure is sensitive to the disturbance standard deviation, 
σ. Following Kriström and Riera (1996), we use income, M, in a logarithmic form as the only 
explanatory variable such that βx = α+βMlnM. The income elasticity of mean WTP calculated 
from the model is then  [ln ]/ ln w M E WTP M ε β = ∂ ∂ = .   8 
Consumer surplus measures 
As regards our second indicator of distributional impacts, the welfare measure, 
the wording of the WTP question determines which surplus measure is actually employed 
(see,  e.g.,  Johansson  1987).  Since  the  respondents  were  asked  about  their  willingness  to 
contribute  to  financing  the  same  range  of  recreation  services  in  state owned  parks  as  is 
currently  provided  by  the  government  free  of  charge,  WTP  is  a  measure  of  (quantity 
constrained) equivalent variation. In other words, the ex post level of utility will potentially be 
lower  if  a  payment  is  charged  for  recreation  services.  The  welfare  measure,  equivalent 
variation, expresses the maximum sum of money that individuals should be charged to make 
them as well off as they would be with a reduction in recreational services (Johansson, pp. 62 
64). 
To  illustrate  the  distributional  impacts  of  fees  on  the  equivalent  variation 
(consumer) surplus, we  apply  a marginal willingness to pay  (demand)  curve such  as that 
shown in Fig. 1. Initially, consumer surplus is equal to the area 0aQ1, referring to trip quantity 
level Q1 and price level 0. Implementing a fee raises the price to P and reduces consumer 
surplus to the triangle Pab such that the welfare loss for the consumer is 0PbQ1. As revenues 
accruing to the managing agency are equal to the area 0PbQ2, the social cost of implementing 
the  fee  is  the  efficiency  loss  (deadweight  loss)  Q2bQ1.  From  an  equity  standpoint,  it  is 
important to compare welfare losses and the associated efficiency losses for consumers in 
different  income  categories.  The  size  of  the  efficiency  loss  is  essential  since  it  gives  a 
monetary estimate of the loss for previous users discouraged from using services due to the 
fee. 
In the empirical analysis, we adopt a nonparametric iterative procedure which 
generates a survival function. The survival function is directly estimated from the survey 
responses, taking the empirical distribution as the “true” distribution instead of imposing a   9 
parametric distribution on the data. We will use the algorithm developed in Ayer et al. (1955), 
which was first applied in environmental valuation analyses by Kriström (1990). The method 
has been shown to yield a consistent maximum likelihood estimator (Cosslett 1983) that is 
particularly easy to compute when there are no covariates. The WTP observations are grouped 
in the WTP space into intervals according to the responses obtained.  
Objectives 
The point estimates for mean and median WTP will be estimated parametrically, 
which makes it possible to derive the income elasticity of WTP. Non parametrically derived 
survival distributions are used for estimating the changes in welfare that would result from the 
implementation of fees. The welfare changes are calculated for two income groups of the 
population to illustrate the distribution of the burden of fees, or the incidence of benefits from 
currently subsidized recreation services.  As we hypothesize that not only income but also 
whether recreation services are perceived as private or public goods (or both) affects their 
perceived benefits, we identify the respondents’ use of the services as well as their reactions 
to alternative funding schemes. Consequently, we derive the WTP measures and the income 
elasticity of WTP separately for four subgroups characterized by use (nonusers/users) and the 
payment vehicle used in the survey sample (general tax/recreation pass). In addition, welfare 
changes are calculated for different fee levels reflecting whether the government considers all 
taxpayers (independent of use) or only users in determining the actual fee level.    
 
DATA 
We use data from an extensive national outdoor recreation survey carried out in 
Finland in the years 1997 2000 (Sievänen 2001). The sub survey on the importance of public 
outdoor recreation services ultimately yielded 1,871 questionnaires, constituting a response   10 
rate of 64%. The sample is representative of the Finnish population and includes both users 
and nonusers of state owned recreation and conservation areas. Sampling, data collection, 
pre testing and details of the mixed mode survey (piloting, telephone and mail) are described 
in more detail in Virtanen et al. (2001). (See also Huhtala 2004.) 
The  sub survey  data  used  here  included  answers  to  contingent  valuation 
questions  that  were  intended  to  reflect  the  respondents’  total  annual  WTP  for  recreation 
services in state owned national parks and hiking areas. The respondents were asked about 
their willingness to contribute to financing the same range of services as is currently provided 
by the government free of charge. A recreation pass and a general tax earmarked for the 
provision of outdoor recreation services were used as payment vehicles in two separate sub 
samples. The respondents were asked to choose the sum that came closest to their valuation 
on a payment card (see, e.g., Mitchell & Carson 1989). The following amounts of money 
were listed on the card: FIM 0, 50, 100, 200, 300, 500, 1000, 1500, 2000, over 2000 (1 
€=FIM 5.94
1).  
Table 1 gives summary statistics for the raw WTP distribution from the payment 
card  responses  including  zero  responses,  and  captures  the  basis  for  our  analysis  of 
distributional impacts by comparing the mean WTP measures between lower  and higher 
income groups within both payment vehicles. Although respondents with higher incomes had 
a  higher  WTP,  the  difference  between  income  groups  did  not  prove  to  be  statistically 
significant.  Interestingly,  the  proportion  of  respondents  indicating  zero  WTP  was  highest 
(lowest)  in  the  lower than median  (higher than median)  income  group  when  a  tax  (a 
recreation pass) was used as the payment vehicle. This clearly runs contrary to the assumption 
                                                 
1 Finland adopted the euro (€) as its currency on January 1, 2002; the Finnish mark was the country’s official 
currency at the time of the survey. The exact wording of the questions that elicited respondents’ WTP is given in 
Appendix 2.   11 
of taxes being perceived as pro poor yet is a rational outcome if there are proportionally more 
low income than high income respondents who do not use the services at all.  
[Place Table 1 about here] 
   
The considerable number of respondents indicating a zero WTP could of course 
be  a  concern,  but  the  answers  to  debriefing  questions  in  the  questionnaire  import  certain 
credence to our data set. Only 17% of the zero WTP respondents (4% of the total sample) 
opposed any charge, because they felt that they had a right to use the recreation sites and 
services. On the other hand, 39% of the zero respondents (16% of the total sample) opposed a 
tax,  because  they  considered  taxes  high  enough  already.  The  predicted  probability  of 
respondents being willing to pay something for recreation services (WTP>0) was about 70 % 
in the whole sample, which we consider a relatively realistic figure; especially so as about 
one fifth (22%) of population actually uses these areas annually.   
To  gain  more  insight  into  the  mean  WTP  in  income  groups,  the  same 
comparisons were conducted among nonusers and users (Table 2). When only nonusers were 
studied, WTP was significantly higher among respondents with higher than median incomes 
where the payment vehicle was a general tax. Mean WTP was also compared between all 
nonusers  and  users.  The  difference  was  significant,  with  users  of  state  recreation  and 
conservation areas willing to pay FIM 25 more on average than nonusers. The difference 
between nonusers and users was especially high (FIM 52) among respondents whose income 
was below median when a tax was used as the payment vehicle. A mixed rationale for the 
lower income group is consistent when their use behavior is taken into account: nonusers do 
not necessarily want additional taxes, and users benefit if taxes are progressive.  
[Place Table 2 about here]   12 
 
According to these comparisons, income is an important variable for benefit 
considerations,  but  WTP  is  also  affected  by  interactions  with  personal  use  of  recreation 
services  and  payment  vehicle.  As  both  of  these  variables  are  in  part  related  to  whether 
recreation  services  are  perceived  as  private  and/or  public  goods,  the  picture  of  benefit 
distribution becomes richer and more challenging to analyze. The benefits for nonusers come 
exclusively from public good considerations, and altruistic motives are likely to play a role. In 
a similar manner, tax payments, in contrast to fees, dissociate willingness to pay from own 
use only. Willingness to pay taxes then expresses a general interest in allocating resources to 
recreation regardless of the ultimate beneficiaries. 
RESULTS 
To calculate the income elasticity of WTP, we need to evaluate the function 
relating WTP to income. While interval regression was used to correct for the range of values 
displayed on the payment card, we followed Cameron and Huppert and used midpoint of 
reported  income  category  in  estimations  without  attempting  to  compensate  for  the 
measurement  error  inherent  in  the  income  variable.  Interval  regressions  were  carried  out 
separately for five sub samples: a sample including all respondents, a sample including only 
nonuser  (user)  respondents,  and  a  sample  including  respondents  who  had  received  a 
questionnaire presenting a general tax increase (recreation pass) as a payment vehicle. Table 3 
summarizes the estimation results.  
[Place Table 3 about here] 
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In every sample, the estimate of the income elasticity of WTP, w ε , receives a 
value considerably below one, indicating that policies providing recreation areas favor “the 
poor”.  However,  it  is  appropriate  to  focus  on  samples  where  the  income  variable  is 
statistically significant (samples “All”, “Nonusers”, and “Tax” in Table 3).  This comparison 
suggests that a tax has the largest income effect ( 0.20 w ε = ). Hence, the low income groups 
would not necessarily favor tax financing of the current policy if a user fee were an option. 
This  result  is  in  line  with  a  previous  empirical  finding  on  progressive  payment  vehicles 
(Schläpfer 2006). However, an economically more intuitive explanation for our finding here 
could be the sensitivity of the payment vehicle to use behavior. Recall that the tax option 
generated a statistically significant difference in WTP between nonusers and users in the low 
income group (Table 2), suggesting that nonusers who dislike tax financing may dominate the 
responses of those with a low income. This inference is also consistent with the finding that 
the  income  effect  is  slightly  larger  for  nonusers  ( 0.12 w ε = )  than  for  all  respondents 
( 0.10 w ε = ),  but  as  the  difference  is  minimal  one  should  be  careful  to  avoid 
overinterpretation. We cannot say anything definite about the respondents who had actually 
used the recreation services, because the income coefficient was not statistically significant. 
Accordingly, we analyze empirical WTP distribution non parametrically in the following. If 
one  were  to  draw  conclusions  from  the  point  estimates  presented  in  Table  3,  the  most 
conservative  overall  assessment  would  still  be  that  current  policy  does  not  discriminate 
against those with lower incomes, because the income elasticities turned out to be low.  
To  get  a  more  comprehensive  picture  of  the  distributional  impacts  between 
income groups, we examine the entire empirical WTP distribution and observed use. In what 
follows we will use the Ayer estimator, because it describes the empirical distribution without 
parametric  constraints.  The  estimator  generates  a  median  WTP  of  FIM  84,  which  is  a   14 
considerably  higher  estimate  than  the  parametric  ones  reported  in  Table  3.  However,  the 
differences in the distribution of WTP as such are important for a comparison of welfare 
changes between income groups. To compare the impacts on high income and low income 
user respondents, we derive WTP survival distributions by income group to estimate the loss 
of consumer surplus for alternative policy scenarios involving fees. 
Using the empirical distribution generated by the Ayer estimator we can now 
approximate the “true” demand schedule by calibrating the number of visits at the zero fee 
level to the current number of visits by the population as predicted by the sample of users, i.e., 
over 6.2 million per year. As the demand is expressed in terms of total number of visits, the 
WTP must be adjusted for the number of visits reported by the respondents.  
Fig.  2  gives  a  first  impression  of  the  differences  in  demand  for  recreation 
between the income groups. The demand curve seems to be more elastic for the lower income 
than for the higher income group at low fee levels, but high fees produce a considerable effect 
for higher income groups as well. This indicates that there are differences in the demand 
elasticities by income group, and we get an important insight into the welfare impact of a 
chosen fee level. 
Normally  it  is  assumed  that  the  median  voter  in  the  overall  population 
determines the level of the user fee, should one be implemented. Both users and nonusers 
would  participate  in  any  putative  referendum  and  our  findings  indicate  that  these  groups 
together would support  a median WTP of FIM 84. As the government would collect fee 
revenue only from users, however, it might use different estimates of visit frequencies when 
considering the appropriate fee level. The average number of visits per year is 1.35 for the 
whole population, including nonusers, and 7.08 for users only. Table 4 summarizes the results 
for the welfare changes for two fee scenarios using the Ayer estimator: Scenario I) An annual   15 
fee of FIM 63 (about € 11) per visit, which is the WTP accepted by a median voter (FIM 84) 
divided by the average number of visits for the whole population (1.35); and Scenario II) An 
annual fee of FIM 12 (about € 2) per visit, which is the WTP accepted by a median voter 
(FIM 84) divided by the average number of visits per year for users only (7.08). To allow 
more reliable comparisons between groups we calculated both upper and lower bounds for the 
welfare measures for four separate income groups (see Boman et al. 1999). We report the 
changes per person as averages of upper and lower bound estimates in Table 4. 
[Place Table 4 about here] 
 
The results of Scenario I suggest that current policy favors “the rich”. In other 
words,  a  policy  reform  implementing  a  fee  of  FIM  63  per  year  would  generate  a  larger 
welfare loss for those with a higher rather than a lower income. This suggests that a policy 
reform implementing a fee of FIM 63 per year would be more beneficial for the lower income 
than for the higher income group. Interestingly, this result contrasts with the results of our 
elasticity estimates. 
If we focus on welfare change, we find similar results in the case of Scenario II. 
The higher income groups would seem to suffer a larger welfare loss if the fee policy were 
implemented. However, the results of benefit incidence become more ambiguous when we 
look  at  the  efficiency  loss  in  the  case  of  a  small fee.  In  the  case  of  a  small  increase  in 
recreation fee (from zero to FIM 12, or €2 in Scenario II), the lower income group would 
suffer a larger efficiency loss than the higher income group. This effect is the opposite of that 
seen in the case of a large increase in fee (from zero to FIM 63 or €11 in Scenario I). As the 
size of the efficiency loss gives a monetary estimate of the loss for previous users discouraged 
from using services due to a fee, the result shows that for the lower income group even a low   16 
fee would discourage the use of services by those who had previously taken advantage of 
them. 
The ratio of efficiency loss and welfare loss (EL/WL) is reported in Table 4, 
illustrating the magnitude of the efficiency loss for the two income groups at the two fee 
levels. At a low fee level the share of efficiency loss is higher in the lower income group 
(44%)  than  in  the  higher income  group  (28%).  As  the  fee  increases,  the  efficiency  loss 
becomes relatively more important for the higher income group. This effect is illustrated in 
Fig. 3, which depicts the welfare and efficiency losses and fee revenue at various fee levels 
for the two income groups. The figure also shows that the fee revenue remains relatively 
stable for the lower income group, because no matter how small the fee might be, it affects 
the demand immediately by decreasing the use of recreation services. Those with a higher 
income would tolerate low fees, but the fee revenue would decrease at high fee levels.  
These results reflect a phenomenon commonly observed when estimating the 
demand elasticity of consumption goods: demand is more elastic for lower income groups 
from zero fees to low fee levels, but high fee levels produce a considerable effect for higher 
income  groups  as  well.  Our  findings  underscore  the  importance  of  analyzing  the  welfare 
effects  along  the  whole  demand  curve  instead  of  focusing  on  point  estimates  of  income 
elasticity.  
   
DISCUSSION 
We  have  investigated  the  patterns  of  distribution  of  benefits  associated  with 
recreation services. The results of our analysis indicate that nonusers also gain considerable 
benefits from public recreation services. The estimates of income elasticity of WTP show that 
provision of recreation services seems to benefit those with lower incomes more than those   17 
with higher incomes. However, our analysis illustrates the problems associated with the use of 
point estimates of income elasticity in distributional analysis. From our case study we can 
conclude that analyzing welfare changes in components on various parts of the demand curve 
gives a more versatile picture of the distributional effects of a policy than can be had from 
point estimates of income elasticity.  
The  results  of  our  case  study  make  it  possible  to  evaluate  the  efficiency  of 
alternative financing mechanisms for the agency providing recreation services. They show 
that the efficiency loss of a fee compared to fee revenue depended crucially on the fee level. 
At a lower level, the fee revenue was almost twice as high as the efficiency loss, but at a 
higher level the efficiency loss was approximately three times the fee revenue. By way of 
comparison, the efficiency loss of taxation in Finland (including commodity taxes) has been 
estimated  at  between  40  and  65  %  depending  on  the  supply  elasticity  of  labor  (Prime 
Minister’s Office 2002). In conclusion, our results indicate that financing using fees leads to 
higher efficiency if the fee level is low enough but that low fees would hurt those with lower 
incomes  relatively  more.  In  other  words,  there  seems  to  be  a  certain  trade off  between 
efficiency and equity. 
The paper also yields an interesting policy implication regarding use values, i.e., 
that the current policy of publicly provided free recreation services may in fact benefit those 
with higher incomes. Implementing fees would mean a welfare loss particularly for higher 
income people. However, even a modest fee decreases use of recreational areas by lower 
income individuals. This implies that if the policy goal is to impose a fee that has equally 
distributed welfare effects, the fee should be “high enough”, although this would necessitate a 
policy that recycles revenues from fees back to lower income users. If the decision on a fee 
were made by the users only, they would vote for a fee that would be too low from an equity   18 
point of view. Indeed, our results indicate that a majority voting in a referendum might yield 
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APPENDIX 1 
Formally, the econometric model is 
(1)  y* =  βx  +  ε,  ε ~ N[0,σ
2], 
  y   =  j  if  A(j 1)  ≤  y*  ≤  A(j), j = 1,...,J, A(0) =  ∞, A(J) = +∞. 
Let Li and Ui denote the lower and upper limits of the payment card interval. If 
yi equals 1, Li is A(0) =  ∞ and Ui is A(1), the first limit value given. The log likelihood 











 − −      = Φ −Φ      
      ∑ ,  
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative density function. Once the optimized β and σ 
have been attained, the conditional mean of y* for any given vector of variables will be βx. 
The model estimation is a standard procedure included in several computer packages.   19 
 
APPENDIX 2 
Willingness to Pay Questions 
 
“The maintenance costs of recreation areas are publicly financed. The purpose of the 
following questions is to get some insight into HOW MUCH YOU VALUE THE 
OPPORTUNITY TO USE STATE OWNED RECREATION AREAS AND 
NATIONAL PARKS.” 
 
The wording of the question on WTP in the form of an entrance fee read: 
“Suppose that the users of recreation areas and national parks had to buy a personal 
recreation pass, the sales revenues from which would be used for maintenance of these 
areas. The pass would entitle one to access to the recreation areas and the use of basic 
services such as campfire sites, firewood, and waste disposal. 
 
How much would you be willing to pay at most for an annual recreation pass which 
would allow you to use state owned recreation areas and national parks? 
 
The wording of the question on WTP in the form of taxes was similar:  
“Suppose that a general tax increase would be needed to maintain the basic services in 
recreation areas and national parks and their provision free of charge. The basic 
services include the use of campfire sites, firewood, and waste disposal and other 
basic facilities. 
 
How much more tax would you be willing to pay per year at most, if it were 
guaranteed that the additional tax revenues would be used for maintenance of 
recreation areas?” 
   20 
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Huhtala and Pouta, Figure 1 
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Figure 3. Fee revenue, efficiency and welfare loss by fee level in the income groups. 
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Table 1 Mean WTP per year (FIM) based on responses in the payment card, and proportion 
of zero WTP (%) by income group and payment vehicle in the data set (N=1582 ). 
 
Income  Mean WTP(FIM)/Proportion WTP=0 (%) 
  Lower than median  Higher than median 
Payment vehicle  Tax  FIM 90 / 40.2%  FIM 105 / 33.7% 
  Recreation pass  FIM 94 / 31.2%  FIM 97 / 23.9% 
   26 
Table 2. Mean WTP per year (FIM) among nonusers and users by income group and payment 
vehicle in the data set. 
 
Nonuser  User 
Income 









Payment vehicle  Tax  FIM 78
1)2)  FIM 102
1)  FIM 130
2)  FIM 110 
  Recreation pass  FIM 83  FIM 95  FIM 116  FIM 103 
  Both  FIM 87
3)  FIM 112
3) 
Notes: Superscripts indicate statistically significant differences: 1) among nonusers:  between income groups; 2) 
among the lower than median income group: between users and nonusers; and 3) between nonusers and users.  
   27 
Table 3. Interval regression results, WTP and income elasticity of WTP. 
                        All  Nonusers  Users  Payment vehicle  
        Tax  Recreation pass 








































WTP FIM per 
year: 
         
Mean  113  107  128  119  109 
Median  47  42  62  39  54 
w ε   0.10  0.12  0.06  0.20  0.01 
N  1582  1272  396  753  829 
Notes:  α = constant,  M β = coefficient for log of income (FIM 1000), and σ = disturbance standard deviation 
   28 
Table 4. Fee revenue, efficiency and welfare loss for two fee scenarios.  
   
  Income 
  Lower than median 
 




Scenario I: Fee FIM 63
1)  FIM 
Fee revenue               11 500 000                    9 300 000                  20 800 000    
Efficiency loss (EL)        
   lower estimate               25 500 000                  40 400 000                  65 900 000    
   upper estimate                28 900 000                  45 300 000                  74 200 000    
   mean               27 200 000                  42 900 000                  70 100 000    
Welfare loss (WL)       
   lower estimate               37 000 000                  49 700 000                  86 700 000    
   upper estimate                40 400 000                  54 600 000                  95 000 000    
   mean               38 700 000                  52 200 000                  90 900 000    
EL/WL                          0.70                             0.82                             0.77    
Scenario II: Fee FIM 12
2)   
Fee revenue               10 700 000                  16 200 000                  26 900 000    
Efficiency loss (EL)        
   lower estimate                 7 900 000                    5 900 000                  13 800 000    
   upper estimate                  9 300 000                    6 800 000                  16 100 000    
   mean                 8 600 000                    6 400 000                  15 000 000    
Welfare loss (WL)       
   lower estimate               18 700 000                  22 100 000                  40 700 000    
   upper estimate                20 000 000                  22 900 000                  42 900 000    
   mean               19 400 000                  22 500 000                  41 800 000    
EL/WL  0.44  0.28  0.36 
Notes:
  
1) WTP (FIM 84) divided by average number of visits of all respondents per year (1.35)  
2) WTP (FIM 84) divided by average number of visits of users per year (7.08) 